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Abstract
Cybersecurity attacks are a major and increasing burden to economic and social systems globally.
Here we analyze the principles of security in different domains and demonstrate an architectural
flaw in current cybersecurity. Cybersecurity is inherently weak because it is missing the ability
to defend the overall system instead of individual computers. The current architecture enables
all nodes in the computer network to communicate transparently with one another, so security
would require protecting every computer in the network from all possible attacks. In contrast,
other systems depend on system-wide protections. In providing conventional security, police patrol
neighborhoods and the military secures borders, rather than defending each individual household.
Likewise, in biology, the immune system provides security against viruses and bacteria using pri-
marily action at the skin, membranes, and blood, rather than requiring each cell to defend itself.
We propose applying these same principles to address the cybersecurity challenge. This will re-
quire: (a) Enabling pervasive distribution of self-propagating securityware and creating a developer
community for such securityware, and (b) Modifying the protocols of internet routers to accommo-
date adaptive security software that would regulate internet traffic. The analysis of the immune
system architecture provides many other principles that should be applied to cybersecurity. Among
these principles is a careful interplay of detection and action that includes evolutionary improve-
ment. However, achieving significant security gains by applying these principles depends strongly
on remedying the underlying architectural limitations.
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Preface
In developing revolutionary concepts of Naval Warfare,[1–10] the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions Strategic Studies Group (SSG) has anticipated concepts that are being now adopted
widely. Among these concepts are Network Centric Warfare and FORCEnet. [1, 5, 11]
Modern technology enables a new focus on the interactions and relationships of action com-
prising a network of human beings and technology as central to advantage in military conflict.
More significantly, the challenges of 21st century warfare require significantly greater levels
of capability for which networks appear to be well suited, and even necessary.
In support of the SSG, Yaneer Bar-Yam, president of the New England Complex Systems
Institute (http://www.necsi.edu), has provided a fundamental scientific basis using multi-
scale representations for analysis of the capabilities of organizations. [12-21] His analysis
characterizes the capabilities and limitations of traditional and networked military organi-
zations.
Through periodic lectures at the SSG beginning in January 2000 that have informed
SSG reports, and through papers [22–25] addressing specific questions in military force
organization and transformation, a basis for understanding is being developed of modern
military conflict that enables generalization from experience gained to new and novel military
responsibilities.
One of the central insights provided by multiscale representations is that there are distinct
types of networks that are relevant to military operations. [12, 24, 25] One of these is a
network of agents that are individually capable of action, e.g. warfighters in a battlespace. A
second is a network of decision makers that gathers information widely and makes decisions
collectively about highly specific actions to perform, where the action is then executed,
perhaps by a large and centrally directed force. The former can be considered in analogy
to the human immune system where the individual agents are the blood cells that battle
harmful agents such as infections within the human body. The second can be considered in
analogy to the human neuro-muscular system where the individual agents of the network
are the nerve cells whose collective decision making ability far exceeds that of a single cell,
and the decision making process results in the actions performed by the muscles.
Distributed networks are particularly needed when facing enemies that are themselves
distributed networks—as is apparent in counter terrorism and in cyber security. Both are
i
growing challenges. The attached report focuses on cyber security. Today, cyber exploits—
spam, malware, denial of service, and security breaches—are widespread. As cyber space
becomes an increasingly integral part of the functioning of all human activities security in
this domain becomes an increasingly critical and unmet challenge. This report presents a
framework for understanding the inherent limitations of existing cyber security and how to
fundamentally improve its capabilities.
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Executive Summary
Increasing global interdependence has resulted in distributed human terror networks and
cyber security challenges. Actions by and on networks can result in major damage even
though individual agents causing it are difficult to locate or identify. Traditional methods
of centralized control and local response cannot meet these challenges due to the funda-
mental constraints on distributed information gathering, detection and coordinated action.
Distributed networked security systems are necessary for effective response. Rather than ad-
dressing specific challenges of today, the vulnerability caused by global communication and
transportation must be met by creating security systems with necessary capabilities to meet
a wide range of challenges that are possible in these systems. With traditional approaches
to security cyber systems are particularly at risk given the rapidity of action and necessary
response.
Security challenges follow certain general patterns. Recognizing the principles of effective
security response provides guidance to meeting new high complexity challenges in global
terror networks and cyber security. Key principles can be found from analyzing security
systems in other domains. In this paper we analyze the biological immune system which is
responsible for analogous security problems within human physiology. The immune system
has evolved a dispersed distributed-control system that can successfully respond to generic
and novel threats and can distinguish threat agents from self and attack threats/invaders
with necessary force.
The human immune system consists of billions of cells that coordinate response to security
challenges in the human body. The activity of the immune system cannot be understood as a
centrally managed process, but rather as arising from a large number of local communications
among specialized components to achieve an emergent response. It achieves high success
rates, is robust, scalable, flexible, and is generally capable of distinguishing self from non-self
in actions. It dynamically refines its ability to detect pathogens by evolutionary selection.
Actions of the immune system can be divided into three layers. The first layer consists of
barriers between security domains, including the skin and membranes between compartments
of the body. The second layer consists of responses to damage of the system affecting
many cells, including repairing barriers and tissues. The third layer, the adaptive immune
system, responds to the finest scale challenges, detection and response to cells or molecules
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distributed through the system. Of particular concern are the viruses and bacteria that
can replicate rapidly from a small to large number. All layers of the immune system have
analogs in human and cyber security. The most difficult to understand and therefore the
focus of our attention is the adaptive immune system.
The central capabilities of the adaptive immune system are detection and action, whose
generalized application must be found in any security system. Detection is achieved by
mapping the space of observed structures or behaviors onto a reduced set of possibilities,
which are partitioned into threat and non-threat, i.e. non-self and self. When a match
is found in the environment to a non-self template, an action is triggered. Detection and
action are separated functions of components of the system, requiring careful regulatory
interplay between them to enable action without damage to self, corresponding to collat-
eral damage. Specific details of communication protocols and interplay of detection and
action agents reveal the strategies the immune system employs in a system wide response
whose detection ability increases rapidly in order to eliminate even individual molecular or
cellular harmful agents. This requires the ability to replicate and distribute the detection
mechanisms and action response rapidly throughout the system. The rapid development of
improved response involves progressive refinement of detection by a process corresponding
to evolutionary selection, similar to breeding of desired features in agriculture. Improved
detection templates developed for a particular threat are distributed throughout the system
to enable effective local response.
The relevance of the immune system model to cyber security arose when computer com-
munication systems transitioned from infrequent and low bandwidth processes to increas-
ingly pervasive, persistent and high speed networks. The importance of security is growing
as the Internet is used not just as an adjunct to activities for communication about them,
but rather as a necessary component of a wide range of economic and social functions. The
need for security is apparent in the large impact of spam, spyware, phishing, zombie net-
works, denial of service attacks, internet fraud, identify theft, and breaches of high security
systems. The underlying cause of the need for security is the transition of the Internet
connected computers to behavior as a tightly linked system analogous to a multicellular
organism.
Existing cyber security systems have parallels to the immune system but these parallels
are incomplete. Corresponding to the barriers found in the first level of security are fire-
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walls and separation of distinct networks, e.g. ATM and bank transaction networks where
these are separated from the Internet. The second layer of security consists of response
to widespread exploits, including Domain Name Server Black Lists (DNSBLs) for blocking
spam from their sources. The third layer of security includes virus scanners and e-mail
filters that detect malware or spam on an individual computer. Detection makes use of
a characterization of programs or e-mail by features (bit strings and logical operations on
these bit strings) that provide signatures similar to the detection templates of the immune
system. Considering the correspondence with the immune system reveals that the response
to detection in cyber security is not pervasive throughout the system.
Our analysis of the immune response identifies the principles of successful response. While
there are similarities to the immune system response in cyber security, we find two major
gaps in the architecture of the Internet. Without addressing these issues, improved cyber
security will be difficult or impossible to attain. First, there is no mechanism for distri-
bution of a response throughout the system. While individuals can subscribe to security
systems that are distributed to some degree, it is optional. Moreover, local information
about detection is not redistributed throughout the system. Note that malware does have
the capability of replication and distribution. The absence of parallel capabilities in security
agents enables attackers an inherent advantage over security efforts. Second, the existing
security system is not a collective security system in that it does not protect the Internet
but rather protects individual components of the Internet. The ability of any part of the
Internet to send messages to any other part of the Internet without encountering security
systems implies that weakest elements can be attacked, compromised, or controlled to enable
progressively larger infestation of the system. Conversely, the inability to mount a perva-
sive defense is a fundamental limitation on security which is diametrically counter to the
corresponding processes of immune system response. Without a collective security system,
the only methods for progress are to harden each element of the Internet, a much larger
security burden destined to be ineffective. Specifically, the only means are to improve the
security of the operating system on each computer. Even so, computers that are operated by
individuals that desire to cause harm would continue to be security risks. The implications
of these gaps in the security system are that there is no mechanism within cyberspace for
security actions to counter-attack the sources of attacks. Moreover, there is no mechanism
for blocking their attacks at point of entry into the Internet rather than at point of attack
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at another node.
Addressing cyber security would require either or both: (a) Making pervasive distribu-
tion of self-propagating but non-destructive security ware acceptable and create a developer
community for such security ware. (b) Modifying the protocols of internet routers to accom-
modate adaptive security software that would regulate internet traffic of other kinds and
self-regulate. These modifications would alter the perspective of the ”rights” of the Internet,
the right of transmission and the right of any node to communicate to any other node of the
system. An effective security system requires that this right be limited, as best as possible,
to those who do not cause damage to the system.
The analysis of the immune system architecture provides many other principles of security
that can be applied to cyber security. Among these principles is a careful interplay of
detection and action that includes evolutionary improvement of the detection and response
capability. However, any advances in applying such principles will have minimal impact as
long as the underlying architectural limitations persist.
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I. OVERVIEW ON SECURITY
The current strategies used in human and cyber security are not capable of handling
threats in our increasingly interdependent world. Challenges in human security are changing
through global terror networks. Cyber security, by virtue of its rapid and hidden processes
is arguably an even greater challenge that is poorly met by existing systems. Severe exploits
and massive system burden from actors in cyberspace are common today. Were this extent
of malware (viruses, trojans, spyware) and spam found at the human level, it would be
considered a major breakdown of a social system.
The demands of addressing current challenges in human and cyber security are motivating
the development of fundamentally new approaches. An essential feature of new challenges
is their distributed nature. Global transportation and communication systems enable dis-
tributed groups of individuals to cause major physical or informational damage, elevating the
global challenge of maintaining security at any location. On the one hand, traditional police
forces with solely local authority cannot respond to global relationships and associations.
On the other hand, the many possible actions of diverse forms can overwhelm centralized
responses due to the inability to gather and process information, determine courses of lo-
cal action, and distribute control messages appropriately. The distributed nature of these
challenges demands a distributed, and correspondingly complex, response.[12]
Traditional security revolves around localized agents of various sizes, from individual
criminals to national armies. Such agents manifest in the local damage they cause. To
combat such agents, the source of the damage must be identified and an appropriate local
response mounted. In general, the possible damage is limited to the scope of the agent. Small
actions are harder to detect, but are commensurately responsible for less damage. Larger
actions responsible for larger-scale damage are easier to observe by virtue of their size. From
this perspective, coordinated, distributed actions present a new challenge in that any one
of them is difficult to detect, the impact of any one agent may be in a different location,
and the collective effect of multiple agents can be large. Moreover, an additional universal
aspect of these challenges is their ability to proliferate so that a small scale challenge can
grow by recruitment to a large scale over a short period of time.
An essential aspect of distributed, coordinated action is the availability of necessary
communication and transportation mechanisms. It is essential to recognize that modern
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social and technological changes create the opportunities for communication, transportation
and recruitment by virtue of the structures that are developed for the functioning of society
itself. Changes in global connectivity are driving vulnerability to security challenges that
are inherent in the structure of the system.
Recognizing that security challenges stem from changes in social connectivity is impor-
tant. Otherwise we may be fooled into addressing only specific current challenges, and fail
to meet the next challenge that arises. Solving the current challenge will not eliminate the
general vulnerability. Instead, it is necessary to create systems that are able to address
challenges of various kinds that surely will arise in the future.
The changes in global communication and transportation systems are easily recognized
in the human sphere given the increasing ease and frequency of global transportation and
communication among people. However, it is even more dramatic in the cyber space context
where changes can be more rapid and the time scale of response may be shorter.
A useful paradigm for the study of distributed response security systems is the biological
immune system. The immune system is the biological system responsible for internal secu-
rity. The analogy between biological attackers and computer attackers is well established in
the notion of “computer viruses.”[31] Still, the key to developing effective systems of secu-
rity is understanding the principles of immune system function so they can be generalized.
In this paper, we frame the essential issues to guide a more general approach to using the
structure and processes of the immune system to inform distributed human and information
technology security. We focus on the part of the immune system designed to address the
most complex distributed challenges corresponding to the highly complex distributed chal-
lenges in human and cyber security. In this context we detail how the distributed structure
and the key interactions between agents enables the remarkable level of success achieved in
a demanding security environment. This success is measured by the ability to eliminate to
the last one adversaries that are capable of rapid proliferation if left unchecked.
This paper is organized upon the concept that identifying principles from one security
system can serve as a foundation for modeling/organizing other security systems with com-
parable complexity. Understanding principles of security from the immune system is not the
same as making an analogy between biological and social or technological systems. Prin-
ciples embody correspondences that reflect essential logical or mathematical relationships
between elements, structures and behaviors. While we do not provide here the formal corre-
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spondence, we strive to make the nature of the formal relationships clear in the presentation.
Our primary conclusions are that the existing structure of the Internet does not allow for
a security system that is able to address its security challenges. This architectural problem
supersedes all specifics, as it is necessary to address the underlying architectural problems
in order to enable implementation of effective security.
In order to establish the fundamental gap in the ability of the current security systems
we explain the functioning of the biological immune systems solution to its own security
problem. We then discuss the mechanisms that have been used to address cyber security,
why they fail, and what changes are necessary to enable success.
II. THE IMMUNE SYSTEM
A. Introduction to the immune system
Human beings possess an immune system responsible for the well-being of trillions of cells,
itself comprised of billions of interacting pieces, with no single central focus of control. The
immune system is a medically significant arena of study, as it provides our defense against
diseases, and failures of its operation lead to auto-immune disorders. It also provides an
important context for developing our understanding of universal principles that apply across
diverse complex systems including social and technological ones.
The immune system can be understood as a system with emergent response. The many
components of the immune system function by collectively responding to challenges. The
natural scale of its response locally may involve only a few cells, throughout the system it
involves many cells responding to potentially distributed challenges in a coordinated fash-
ion. When necessary, the response in any one location can increase dramatically to achieve
a macroscopic response as is found in visible infections. Collective actions are distributed
among multiple cells, achieving a balance where each cell is important but generally not
essential. This emergent behavior cannot be understood by description of individual agents.
It must be understood by the coupling of individual cell actions through inter-cellular inter-
action.
The immune system has properties that are desirable in any security system: first, it is
robust and resilient, as individual components of the system can be removed without com-
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promising the functionality of the whole. Second, the system is naturally scalable without
substantial modification. Third, it is flexible, often able to cope with pathogens which have
never been seen before. Fourth, it displays specialization, with different cell types perform-
ing the different functions necessary to provide system functionality. Fifth, it is able to
distinguish self from nonself, even when the molecules it produces during its normal affairs
are themselves novel chemical structures.
The immune system exploits the dynamics of evolution to achieve its remarkable success.
Evolution is a central process in the formation of any complex system and is fundamentally
necessary to achieve success in complex tasks. [12] Evolution enables improvement of a
system to face challenges that cannot be anticipated. Understanding how this works is
therefore necessary for our ability to address many challenges. In particular, it is important
to understand that not only is the immune system itself a product of evolution, but it also
applies evolution to address specific immune responses. This latter evolution takes place
within a single organism.
B. Immune system architecture
The biological immune system guards against infection in multiple ways, providing a
“layered defense” with increasing specificity. Pathogens which penetrate system barriers
(e.g., skin) are challenged by the innate immune system, and the adaptive immune system.
These mechanisms are constantly active, meeting a dynamically changing and large set of
challenges at all times. Significant illness occurs only when they fail.
The first layer of security consists of the barriers themselves. Barriers distinguish the self
from other at the large scale. They separate space to that controlled and not controlled,
or subject to different levels of control. The immune system includes the skin and other
membranes that separate specific compartments of the body. The skin is the boundary that
separates the internal space where the immune system controls the fine scale security, from
the space outside the system which is not subject to security.
The second layer of the immune system is designed to meet failures of the first layer. This
includes disruptions of the barrier itself, repairing the skin, and responding to challenges
that occur when there are significant breaches of the skin. A principle of innate immunity is
to characterize damage and threats that are of intermediate scale — involving many cells —
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and therefore generic features of large classes of hazards rather than specific to the attacker
types. These include response to blood loss (clotting) or to tissue damage (inflamation).
The third layer of the immune system addresses the finest scale challenges. In particular,
the role of adaptive immunity is to identify specific individual threats that do not trigger the
innate immune response: individual molecules, cells or loosely associated groups of molecules
or cells distributed through the system.
While there are many potential causes of harm that the immune system guards against,
there are two that are of particular note because they are able to self-replicate and thus
require a response that both can address a large number of such attackers and yet detect a
very small number, even down to a single individual. There are two primary types of such
foreign agents: molecular attackers, viruses, and cellular attackers, commonly bacteria but
also other replicating single celled organisms.
C. Specific fine scale (adaptive) response
Our focus is on the adaptive immune system whose role is to identify and attack specific
intruders or self cells that change behavior to become a threat to survival. Any security
system must perform certain key tasks.
1. Detection. Hostile elements introduced into the system or arising within the system
must be noted, distinguished from non-hostile elements and identified before action
can be taken.
2. Action. Once a threat has been identified and characterized, a response must be
mounted which is appropriate to both the quantity and the nature of the threat.
We now address these points in more detail.
III. ADAPTIVE IMMUNE RESPONSE
A. Identification
The essence of recognizing a threat is distinguishing signatures of its structure or behavior.
The identification of a foreign “antigen” in the immune system is analogous to distinguishing
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undesirable from desirable elements in any system. While this is a commonly necessary
task, this form of pattern recognition is fundamentally difficult. Understanding how it is
accomplished is key to the design of any security system.
Central to identification is a way to map any structure or behavior that is to be char-
acterized onto a smaller and better defined set of “possibilities.” This set of possibilities
is then partitioned, perhaps dynamically, into a set that are considered a threat and those
that are not a threat.
The immune system performs this distinction by starting from a large set of prototypes
within the space of possibilities, and rejects from this set those that are matches to com-
ponents of self. The remaining set are used for identification of antigens. Also, perhaps,
damage caused may be used as evidence. When an antigen is detected, action is initiated,
and the prototypes are refined by evolutionary processes to achieve better matching, and
thus more rapid response.
B. Capacity for action
The identification of the presence of a threat must trigger a response that will be effective
in meeting that threat. The response could be of various kinds, but it must modify to render
harmless, or eliminate the threat from the system.
In a distributed system, such as the immune system, an appropriate level of response
must be recruited from nearby or from far away depending on the size of the response
needed. Once the existence of a threat has been identified, the ongoing need for detection
should be simplified for the responding agents. This enables action to be performed by
components that are not as capable of performing differentiation by themselves, but are
instead specialized for action against a threat.
The existence of responders who are then less capable of discrimination, however, in-
creases the likelihood of actions that are against self rather than against threats. This
challenge must be met by careful regulatory processes for triggering action. The need to
identify threats, and then selectively trigger action requires balanced protocols to safeguard
self while defeating threats. Examples of this issue in human security include the problems of
“friendly fire” and “collateral damage” in warfare, which constitute harm to responders and
to bystanders respectively. While these terms imply unintended harm, we can also include in
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this category intentional actions by individual agents that are not consistent with collective
goals, such as war crimes. There are two types of methods for avoiding self-damage. The
first are within an individual agent, analogous to intention of the individual, and the second
involve regulatory interactions between agents at the time of action.
In computer security, similar issues of self-inflicted damage today include issues of “false
positives” such as the blocking of desired e-mails as spam, or blocking of legitimate users
from accessing a system. The extra effort involved in forgotten or mistyped passwords and
password systems can be included as well.
Multiple types of cell and multiple cells of each type are involved in each action of the
immune system. Biological and biochemical details will be discussed in the Appendix; for
the moment, we note that the ability to spread messages and agents throughout the body
via the circulatory system allows initial signals to provoke a systemic reaction to resolve a
challenge. This systemic reaction is not just a call for others to respond to a particular place,
but a pervasive distribution throughout the system of the ability to respond to attackers
that can appear in a distributed fashion and replicate.
C. Evolution as method
The central principle of evolution is the “non-random survival of randomly varying repli-
cators.” [27, 28] In each generation, the replicators which are better able to survive are able
to leave more offspring, and so advantageous traits can spread throughout the population.
If the environment changes, the mixture of traits within the population will change in re-
sponse; populations which cannot adapt in this fashion will quite generally be supplanted
by those who can. We emphasize that the variation that takes place in the traits through,
e.g. mutations, is random, while the selection which acts upon replicators has a much more
deterministic character.
Selection creates a functionality in the replicators over time, where that functionality can
be defined by the ability to meet the criteria of selection. By arranging criteria of selection
to serve a particular purpose, the evolutionary process can serve to induce that purpose in
the replicators.
Such a directed evolutionary process has been variously used both historically and to-
day. The breeding of animals is an artificial way of applying selection criteria to serve a
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purpose that human beings determine.[26] In technological applications, so called genetic or
evolutionary algorithms,[29] specify an artificial measure of “fitness” of a computer-based
replicator and apply random variation and selection to improve the replicators in meeting
that measure. In this context the process of evolution can be considered a form of opti-
mization. Still, computer based evolutionary processes only incorporate some features of
the evolutionary process in nature.[12]
If the goal of a system is relatively easy to specify but the path to achieve that goal
is unclear, then a properly implemented evolutionary process is an approach that can be
effective.
The process of evolution is used by the immune system to improve the most information
intensive aspect of the response process, detection. This process requires effective use of
the existence of some detection to initiate the improvement process so that progressive
improvement of detection is possible. Subsequently, improved detection accelerates the
ability of the system to respond. This requires rapid distribution of the improved capabilities
throughout the system through global dissemination.
IV. THE CYBER SECURITY CHALLENGE
When early “mainframe” computers were replaced by personal computers, an individual
computer still remained largely isolated, interacting with its owner. Programs or data were
transferred via floppy disk or, sometimes, over telephone lines. As networking became
ubiquitous, the rate of ongoing interactions created a global system in which most of the
communications are not observed directly by human beings and individual human response
times are insufficient to monitor the dynamics of the communications. Moreover, the extent
and rate of communication continues to grow.
The widespread use of the Internet for communication and commerce has increased the
need for cyber security.[30] It is important to recognize the change from a system that is
an adjunct and a convenient substitute to more conventional communications, to when such
interactions are an integral part of society. As commerce is increasingly done through the
Internet, the disruption of economic activity through the disruption of such communica-
tions becomes increasingly important. The next stage of development, already occurring in
many contexts, is the integration of the Internet into response systems. Thus the operation
8
of almost every organization is undergoing a transition from isolated computer stations, to
communications, to real time interactions, to integrating essential responses through the net-
work. Increasingly, individual actions require information from multiple sources distributed
through the network, and actions themselves become distributed among multiple individuals
interacting through the network. Potential disruptions of the network system increase in
impact as this occurs.
For example, computers introduced into medical operations might first be used for track-
ing appointments and keeping financial records. Then they might be used for sending pre-
scriptions from physician to pharmacy. Third, they can be used for real time monitoring of
procedures. Finally, they can be used for remote controlling of procedures. Once the final
stage is reached, the disruption of service has real time impacts not only on the communi-
cation about the procedure but the procedure itself.
The need for security has become apparent in the success of Internet fraud, including
breaches of high security systems and theft of personal records. The extent and variety
of “cyber” actions has increased with the ubiquity of spam, spyware, phishing, zombie
networks, denial of service attacks, etc. A spam-blocking service reports over 4.7 billion
spam messages intercepted since November 2005, almost ten times the amount of legitimate
traffic over that period.[56] This includes only the spam which was intercepted. Many of the
spam messages advertise fraudulent products or otherwise attempt to defraud their readers;
they contain links to unlawful sites—which also serves to skew search engines like Google
in their favor; and they often originate from otherwise legitimate computers whose security
has been compromised.
The need for the biological immune system arose when single celled organisms evolved to
form multicellular organisms. As with the change in human social and cyber connectivity,
the connectivity in multicellular organisms leads to a collective vulnerability and a need for
a system to guard against it.
V. CURRENT CYBER SECURITY
There are a number of generally used cyber security systems that are parallel in some way
to the immune system operations. In addition, there are specific efforts to adapt concepts
from the immune system for cyber security.[32–35, 39]
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A. Layered defense
The first layer consisting of barriers in cyber security includes firewalls and the separation
of distinct networks for e.g. ATMs and bank transactions. These security systems prevent
malware from entering a system as skin protects an organism. Barriers within a system,
just as membranes within the body, generally are semi-permeable, using mechanisms to
differentiate what can pass. In cyber security these include password authentication and
S/Key challenges.
The second layer of cyber security includes detection of exploits and generic responses to
them. This includes Domain Name Server Black Lists (DNSBL) often called RBLs (Real-
time Blackhole Lists). These are services that gather and provide lists of IPs that are sources
of spam and other malware. Institutional mail servers can automatically implement policies
that use this information to block domains of the Internet that are sources of spam. The
sources of spam may include servers set up for this purpose, or zombies which are computers
that have been compromised by malware so that they transmit spam and malware on behalf
of others. In effect, zombies are the analog of virus infected cells that become factories for
viruses and other pathogens. The large number of these exploits today results in a response
which is akin to a generic immunity response.
The third layer of cyber security includes virus scanners and e-mail filters are the analogs
of the adaptive immune system.[32] These applications search programs stored on disk or
incoming e-mail messages for signatures of malware and spam. If the detection system is not
specific enough, programs that are valid, and e-mail that is valid are rejected. Alternatively,
malware or spam may not be rejected. The desired versus undesired categories are analogous
to the discrimination of “self” from “other” in the adaptive immune system. Where self
consists of legitimate software and desired e-mail, and other is the malware (virus, Trojan
Horse, etc.) which would compromise the system and spam. The existence of false-positives
and false-negatives that misidentify whether the spam or malware are legitimate is similar
to errors of classification in the immune system as well.
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B. Detection
A computer immune system must detect both known and hitherto unknown viruses or
spam. For this purpose a program fragment, or small piece of data from a larger set can be
used as a detection template. This extracted data can be compared with correspondingly
extracted data from a virus or spam. The latter is known as the “signature” of the virus
or spam. Finding the “signature” within a piece of software indicates that the software has
been infected. Various signatures can be constructed based upon procedures specified by
individuals (heuristic rules), or statistical pattern detection (Bayesian filtering), and collabo-
rative identification (when voluntary human communities manually specify spam signatures
that are shared).[58]
Some detection systems are local in that the software itself learns from labeling by the
user what is spam and what isn’t. In this case the user manually identifies spam and non-
spam, and signatures are extracted automatically that differentiate between the spam and
non-spam by the software.[59] Others are centrally directed by service providers who provide
the software and revise it to add templates for new malware.[60–62] Revisions arise after
reports due to the detection of the virus. Such detection occurs when individuals observe
activity of processes on computers outside of normal operations, or of damage due to such
processes.
Similar issues arise at the level of computer network operation security.[39] Such security
systems operate at the level of the pattern of traffic rather than the content of individual
messages. To detect a deviant computer system that may be the source of other attacks, a
pattern detection system has a representation of the types of patterns that can arise. Among
these a set of “self-patterns” is created, representing the legitimate ways in which traffic can
flow amongst the computers of a Local Area Network (LAN). Abnormal traffic, such as a
computer suddenly sending thousands of e-mail messages to the external Internet, is a “non-
self pattern” and is considered a sign of infection (in this example, the computer may have
been co-opted by a spammer and used as a “zombie” to spread spam and malware).[37, 38]
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VI. WHY CURRENT CYBERSECURITY CANNOT WORK
The examples of Internet based security suggest that existing systems have some similar-
ities with immune system operations. Still, they do not capture the dynamics of communi-
cation and interplay of detection and action that should provide better security and better
self-protection. These limitations include the manner of detection and sharing of signatures
of malware (local, centralized and limited distribution systems), as well as the limits in
implementing actions to prevent or stop attacks and exploits.
Indeed, while cyber security systems today provide some protection for malware and
spam, the ongoing presence of large volumes of spam and malware, and exploits, suggests
that the existing protections are too limited in their abilities and greater attention to the
principles of security as embedded in immune system operations would give rise to improved
outcomes.
There are two fundamental reasons that the current approaches to cybersecurity cannot
work effectively.
First: There is no mechanism for rapid pervasive distribution of security processes that
can respond to new types of malware or spam. The voluntary use of community or cen-
trally generated malware or spam signatures, while widespread, is not pervasive. One way
to understand the ineffectiveness of security distribution is to compare the distribution of
security with that of malware. Malware is much more pervasively and rapidly distributed
than the security that is designed to guard against it. In the immune system, viruses can
be considered to be analogs of antibodies. Both are able to replicate rapidly using cellu-
lar mechanisms and both are able to attack cells or other molecules. This correspondence
makes viruses and antibodies have similar capabilities. Furthermore, T cells are similar to
bacteria in their ability to replicate and attack other cells. This correspondence of defenders
and attackers implies that there are no major gaps in the capabilities of the attackers as
compared to the defenders. By contrast, there is no defensive analog of malware, in that the
anti-malware software is centrally controlled instead of being distributed in origin. A better
correspondence would be a security system that would operate on the basis of a peer-to-peer
protocol. As computer viruses and other malware develop, so would defenders that would
be redistributed automatically across the web. Such a peer-to-peer system would open the
door to more opportunities for malware, but this architecture would give attackers and de-
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fenders equal capabilities, unlike the current situation where attackers have a wider range
of options, with potentially much greater capabilities.
The closest system to the architecture of the immune system from this perspective is an
existing distributed collective response system where multiple users share signatures of spam.
[63, 64] Still, unless these systems are universally adopted, they do not prevent widespread
infection and thus widespread attack — i.e. they are not collective security systems but
rather localized security systems.
Second: The current architecture of the Internet is based upon a protocol (IP [65, 66])
that transmits messages independent of their content. The basic premise is that any valid
message is delivered to its destination. The delivery process involves transfer from the point
of origin through a sequence of nodes (routers) of the internet. Each router reads the target
destination specified by the message (packet) identifies a node to transfer the message to
that will enable eventual delivery to the destination, and transfers it. In this proces, there is
no evaluation of what the mesage contains. Individual messages may be lost in transmission
due to network overload, but not due to evaluation of the contents of the message. This
implies that as far as the sender and receiver are concerned the network is transparent.
Any message is transferred from one node of the network to any other node of the network
without intervention. In considering the transfer of messages, it is important to recognize
that a message is also an action that can be harmful. If we consider each destination node
of the network to be like a “home,” and the network to be like the streets, then from the
point of view of security, this is equivalent to having no police on the streets or military
at the borders. Each household, or individual, must defend him or herself, using means of
protection (e.g. guns, etc.) purchased on the market. That the protection is left to the
individual home reflects the open nature of the Internet. The corresponding system in a
biological sense would enable any cell to approach and attack any other cell of the body.
Under these untenable conditions there would be no collective security in the medium in
which cells are located. Analogously, there is no protection in the medium of the Internet.
The two fundamental limitations of the architecture of the Internet from a security per-
spective imply that there is no mechanism for a security system to prevent actions consisting
of nodes attacking other nodes in the Internet. Attacks that are launched cannot be stopped
before they arrive at their destination. There is also no process that enables removal or elim-
ination of the originators of an attack. Security systems do not have access to nodes of the
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Internet except as they voluntarily participate in security actions by subscribing to security
communities or services. Thus, preventive action or removal is only possible if the originat-
ing node voluntarily participates in a security action. Without such participation, the best
that can be done is to protect from attack at its destination. This implies that an inten-
tional attacker can gain strength and evolve increasingly sophisticated attacks. Attacks can
be focused on particular nodes, either because of their vulnerability or value. In contrast,
to be effective, security must defend all parts of the system it wishes to protect.
In order to develop an effective collective security system similar to the immune or human
security systems, substantial architectural changes must be implemented. Collective security
preventing attacks would require that the routers of the Internet themselves would need to
have protocols that allow refusal of transmission based upon content or extrinsic information
such as point of origin. The routers of the Internet serve as the transmission medium for
the nodes of the Internet. This corresponds to the intercellular fluids, including the blood,
of physiological systems, the primary locus of immune system activity. Such an approach
was implemented against spam transmission early in the history of DNSRBLs [67]; however,
it appears to be abandoned. A router based security system would curtail the “right of
transmission,” which may be considered fundamental in discussions of Freedom of speech.
[68]
Absent a router based security system, the second alternative is to enable automatic
transmission of security software among all terminal (non-router) nodes of the internet.
This would enable rapid and pervasive distribution throughout the system. This is a similar
propagation to that of viruses and other malware. Such automated transmission might
be considered to be less desirable than router based security, as it involves partial loss
of control by owners of the activities on their computers in favor of security operations.
Corresponding software capabilities exist in peer-to-peer systems, and in existing voluntary
security communities.
Thus far we have not discussed the use of human legal systems to pursue human origi-
nators of malware and spam. In this regard there are difficulties inherent in international
law for pursuing such attacks as crime. Perhaps more critically, the different domains and
time scales of Internet activity and human legal activity suggest that this approach will be
difficult to utilize to any significant effect. Criminal prosecution is a high cost and time effort
that can be effective in disrupting non-normative activities but not in curtailing widespread
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actions. Indeed, the existing success in prosecuting Internet crime is limited. [69, 70]
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We performed an analysis of principles of security using the immune system as a model
that provides insight into the functioning of any security system. We identified central
functional attributes of a security system. However, we found that these properties cannot
be effectively implemented in cyber security because of current limitations of the Internet
structure. This is not a limitation of the security principles but rather of the architecture
of the Internet.
Within the current limitations on security systems, security is largely in the hands of
individual nodes. Improving the resistance of individual nodes to attack is critical because a
compromised node will be the source of attacks on other nodes. The main source of weakness
in the system is the vulnerability of operating systems on individual computers. Vulnerable
operating systems should be avoided not just for the security of the individual node but for
the security of the system as a whole.
A focus on individual nodes, however, will miss the essential nature of a collective system
and its vulnerabilities that arise due to the rapid communication. We therefore recommend
that major modifications will be considered that allow the ability to perform security within
the router systems of the Internet rather than in the end nodes. This would entail router
protocols that can be used to reject messages based upon content, with distributed detection
systems to identify which content corresponds to harmful acts. Such a security system must
be carefully designed to avoid harm to self through blocking valid Internet traffic. Indeed,
it is the fear of such blocking that has limited the implementation of such a system. The
use of principles of security obtained from analysis of other security systems, specifically the
immune system, can provide guidance to enable effective processes that minimally impede
or interfere with valid traffic. To this end we summarize our findings of immune system
security.
We found that the three subsystems of the immune system are designed to address chal-
lenges at three scales. The largest scale is the separation of internal and external domains,
i.e. the skin, as well as other partitions of the system by membranes to separate different
security domains. The intermediate scale corresponds to manifest system damage, includ-
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ing damage to the boundaries or tissues, that require repair. The finest scale and highest
complexity system involves responding to distributed collections of molecules or cells that
are difficult to identify in the context of the complex physiology of the body, and are often
able to replicate to create larger scale damage, e.g. viruses and bacteria.
The most specific and distributed system for security involves remarkable level of empha-
sis on detection. Detection can be described in a general fashion that is relevant to security
systems at other levels of organization including human societal, and cyber security. Detec-
tion involves a standard set of templates that are able to characterize sufficiently broadly
potential invaders, but have specificity sufficient to distinguish adversaries from self. Once
detection occurs, multiple processes are used to enhance the ability to detect the adversaries
rapidly and in small numbers.
The detection process is intimately linked to action even though different agents perform
detection and action. The interaction of action agents and detection agents is a local pro-
cess involving identifying individual elements as adversaries and mounting a proportionate
response. These local interactions are carefully designed to avoid self-inflicted damage.
All of the immune system actions utilize widespread communication and transportation to
transport the detection mechanisms throughout the system, to recruit additional defenders,
and to communicate ongoing improvements in detection.
A review of the current major systems for cyber security suggests that there are aspects
of cyber security systems that correspond to the immune system. However, the fundamental
differences in architecture prevent communication and refinement of responses to adversaries
throughout the system. These constraints also severely limit the possible counter attacks,
including the ability to block sources of attacks at the points of origin. With such limitations
overall success in suppressing the large numbers of cyber attacks will be limited. Since
the transportation and communication systems can be exploited by attackers to achieve
widespread damage, they must also be used as part of successful response by defenders.
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VIII. APPENDIX: DETECTION AND RESPONSE IN THE IMMUNE SYSTEM
In this appendix we provide details about the immune system response to identify the
mechanisms by which it provides a capacity for detection and for corrective action. These
are key aspects of immune system response but are generally not currently applicable to
cyber security because of the inherent architecture of the Internet. As explained in the main
paper, should the structure of the Internet be modified in a manner to allow for improved
security, these mechanisms can provide improved guidance for how to proceed.
The adaptive immune system has a high degree of specificity: a “non-self” antigen (a sig-
nature of an adversary) is recognized and responses are tailored to that particular pathogen
(adversary). We will show how the biological system identifies adversary signatures, trans-
mits information to agents who can take action, determines which actions are appropriate,
and how memory functions.
The cells of the adaptive immune system are known as lymphocytes, which are special
types of white blood cells (leukocytes). The two principal categories of lymphocyte, are B
cells and T cells, are further divided into subcategories as explained below. Both derive
from stem cells found in bone marrow, the hematopoietic or blood-producing cells.[42]
B cells have a primary role in identification of adversaries, and T cells are the primary
agents of action in response to the adversaries. The tight coupling of identification and action
results in mutual regulation of activity by B and T cells. When detection occurs, B cells
trigger T cell response, and T cells increase the action of B cells to accelerate detection as
necessary.
A. Detection mechanism
Detection starts with pattern matching between a detection template and entities in the
environment that might be characterized as adversaries. One type of cell, B cells, and one
type of molecule, antibodies, are the biological agents primarily responsible for detection of
threats.
The primary template in the adaptive immune system is the antibody. The antibody is a
molecule that binds to anything whose shape matches (complements) the antibody binding
site. Antibodies can be found in two primary forms. First, as part of a cell where it is
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attached on the surface membrane of a cell to the cell signaling system so that a match
between the antibody and something in the environment triggers a cell response. Second,
antibodies can be released into the blood and when floating around attach themselves to
matching entities.
The key to the use of the antibody as a pattern matching template is the possibility of
generating many different shapes of the molecule binding site. This ability arises because
the antibody is formed of several parts, the parts can be combined together in flexible ways,
and the parts themselves can be varied. An antibody is comprised of four peptide chains
arranged to form a Y-shape. Each of the Y-shape’s two “arms” has a variable region.[43]
The matching between an antibody through binding to another molecule (called an anti-
gen) occurs at the molecular level: the shape of an antibody is complementary to that of
the antigen to which it binds. More precisely, it will bind to a part of the antigen called the
epitope, typically about 600 A˚2 in area.[44]
Antibodies are generated internally by B cells. The mechanisms for their manufacture are
through the read-out of genetic templates for each of the components and their combination
into a single molecule. B cells also are designed to carry the antibodies they generate on
surface membrane receptors as a detection mode. When the antibody binds to something
in the environment the B cell can change its behavior accordingly.
A B cell identifies a threat when the antibodies present on its surface bind to a specific
foreign antigen.[45] B cells that have identified an adversary by binding to it perform a
series of actions to improve future detection of similar adversaries and initiate response.
The actions they take to initiate response will be discussed in the next section.
B. Detection templates
B cells determine which templates to use for detection of invaders through a process which
requires multiple steps, each of which is central to the functioning of the immune system.
The first step is that multiple templates can be generated by cellular mechanisms. By
recombining genetic elements from a “toolbox” of short sequences, a large volume in the
shape space of all possible antigens can be covered.
The second is the process of generating the set of templates that are found in the body
as B cells are formed, mostly in bone marrow. B cells are produced from a type of stem cell.
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They progress through several developmental stages marked by changes in the genetic se-
quences which define the active sites of their antibody molecules. This variation during their
development gives rise to a remarkable diversity of templates associated with distinct B cells.
This large array of prototype templates don’t exhaustively cover the set of possibilities, but
are widely dispersed throughout the set of possibilities.
The third is eliminating templates that correspond to self molecules. Mounting an im-
mune response to the body’s own molecules and cells is extremely undesirable. The body
avoids this (not always perfectly) by inactivating lymphocytes which happen to be self-
reactive after they are generated. During the last stages of their maturation, B cells are
presented with self molecules. B cells which react to these molecules are triggered into
programmed cell death (apoptosis) or modifying their receptors. [43] This process occurs
in part after developing B cells move to the spleen, where they complete their maturation
process.
The fourth is enhancing the presence of B cells whose antibodies have responded in the
past to antigens. This serves as a form of memory. Cells that have not been exposed
to antigen develop into different forms once they have encountered their target antigen.
Some become effector cells, which go on to play an active role in immune response; others
become memory cells, which do not immediately participate in anti-pathogen defense but are
sensitized to an antigen so that a second encounter will stimulate them to become effector
cells. Over the short term their stimulation by antigens that are present in the current
attack contributes to the strength of the response. Memory cells are much longer-lived than
effector cells, persisting sometimes until the death of the animal instead of dying within
days, so they can facilitate rapid immune responses to threats which have been encountered
before.
The fifth is the enhancement of templates matching to current invaders by the process of
evolution, discussed in the next section.
The sixth is the communication between B cells that enables multiple distinct antibodies
to be formed to the same adversary. This is discussed below in the section on B-cell to B-cell
communications.
The seventh is the use of indicators of cellular damage that may reduce the threshold for
detection or trigger it. [50]
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C. Evolution of detection
When a body is attacked by a reproducing agent, such as a virus or a bacterium, the
rate of detection of that invader is critical to the success of the response. Detection of
even individual ones is necessary before they can reproduce, requiring remarkably fast and
pervasive detection. The detection can be enhanced if the detection template is improved
to be a better match to the invader. This is accomplished by a process of progressive
improvement through selecting improved versions, i.e. evolution.
The evolutionary process occurs primarily in specific organs of the body called lymph
nodes. [51] When B cells detect an invader with their antibodies, they take the piece of
the invader that binds to the antibody. They travel to a lymph node and place the antigen
in the wall of the lymph node. B cells reproduce very rapidly in a lymph node. In doing
so they vary by high rates of mutation their own DNA which codes for the antibody they
produce. They use their antibody to test its binding to the antigens in the wall of the lymph
node. The less successful ones rapidly die by programmed cell death. The ones that are
most successful, i.e. the best detectors, are sent out into the blood stream to engage with
the adversary.
As B cells bring pieces of the invaders into the lymph nodes, and the process of selecting
improved binders continues, the B cells released back into the blood stream are continually
improved in their ability to detect the invader. This leads to a dramatic change in the
sensitivity of the immune system to that invader, enabling the system to completely eliminate
the invader.
D. B-cell to B-cell communication: Improving detection
Once an adversary has been detected, identifying multiple ways to detect it both increases
the ability of detection and reduces the possibility of an adversary acting to avoid detection
by modifying their structure and behavior.
B cells that have identified an invader by binding to it, use this detection to enhance
the ability of other cells to identify the invader. The method for doing this is to make less
specific parts of the invader to which other B cells may be able to bind. The B cell breaks
parts of the invader into smaller components and displays these components on the B cell
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surface. Other B cells then bind to these molecules triggering their own response systems.
This creates additional methods for invader detection in addition to the original one detected
by the first B cell.
Since adversaries are not individual molecules or cells, but rather are replicating viruses
and bacteria, the immune system utilizes massive parallelism: many types of pattern detec-
tion templates (antibodies) can be tested simultaneously across the system. This enables
using multiple methods to detect the same type of adversary.
The communication by B cells to other B cells in this way is a key form of cooperation
between cells of the adaptive immune system. The network of interactions also includes
communication from B cells to T cells, and reciprocally from T cells to B cells.
E. B-cell to T-cell communication and intelligence
Cell to cell communication enables B cells to communicate the discovery of antibodies to
the cells responsible for action — T cells. Cell to cell communication is also important for
information gathering by T cells from non-immune cells — the analog of human intelligence.
T cells use a particular “secure” communication channel to receive messages from B cells
and other cells of the body. The security of the communication is provided by MHC
molecules. These are a diverse set of molecules that are highly specific to each individ-
ual. The specific nature of these molecules is maintained by high genetic variability of the
MHC molecules over evolutionary time and within the human population at any one time.
Secure communications are important to prevent invaders from “spoofing” messages to the
T cells.
When a B cell communicates to T cells, the “information,” is in the form of a molecular
fragment on the surface of the B cell bound to a MHC molecule. T cells have the ability to
bind to and recognize the MHC molecule and the molecular fragment that is bound to it.
As described before, a B cells whose antibodies bind to something in the environment
(the antigen) takes the antigen/antibody complex and breaks it into small units, which are
returned to the surface. At the surface the fragments are combined with a MHC molecule.
The surface display of the MHC with the parts of the antigen/antibody complex are then
detected by T cells in the vicinity triggering T cell action.
Similarly, any cell of the body may display MHC molecules with fragments of molecules
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that are found inside the cell. This enables T cells to check for normalcy or cell infection
(e.g. by viruses) from the surface display on a cell.
F. Action agents: T cells and phagocytes
The primary agents responsible for action against threats in the immune system are
T cells. T cells both secrete molecular messengers which can kill other cells or can increase
the growth rate of other cells.
T cells can secrete cytotoxins which can kill other cells. T cells target foreign cells or self
cells that have been infected by foreign agents such as viruses. T cell action is triggered by
their binding to complexes of antibody and MHC molecule, i.e. they are triggered to action
by B cell signaling.
T cells also are responsible for signaling B cells into a more active state. This active
state results in two effects. The first is rapid growth and proliferation. The second is the
manufacturing of more antibodies and their release into the blood and other intercellular
fluids so that they bind to antigens throughout the system and not just when a B cell
encounters them. This is a process that makes the detection itself a form of action. The
binding of the antibodies can disable the pathogens directly or mark them for destruction.
The former is accomplished by interfering with the surface molecules which pathogens use
to infect cells or by binding to the toxins produced by bacteria.
The two different functions of T cells are divided between killer T cells and helper T cells.
The dynamics of killer and helper T-cell response is regulated in part by their responsiveness
to distinct MHC molecules.
Finally, a method is necessary to clean up both the dead cells and molecules, and even
live but marked cells, from the system. This is accomplished by phagocytes. Phagocytes,
are cells that can engulf and use digestive juices to, in effect, eat other cells and molecules.
Their action is triggered by the presence of the antibodies bound to molecules and cells after
their release by B cells. [43]
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G. Post response: Reducing the cohort and memory
The rapid growth of the number of B cells, antigens and T cells in response to an adversary
also requires a mechanism to reduce that number when the response is successful. As the
number of antigens declines, the short lifespan of the B cells and the absence of triggers to
produce additional ones leads to their decline. Additional triggers to accelerate this process
may also take place but must be carefully designed to avoid exploitation.
The immune system is costly, in that providing an immunological defense against foreign
pathogens requires resources — such as energy and nutrients — which are also needed for
muscular and neural activities, reproduction, growth and other biological processes.[40]
Still, once a specific threat has been identified, it is more likely to reappear. This justifies
retention of identification templates, in antigen and B cell form, for future use. This retention
accelerates the response when the same threat reappears.
Some B cells preserve the memory of prior responses by continuing to survive for extended
periods of time after a response. Since some death is unavoidable, they also replicate without
mutation to preserve their antibodies in their offspring. These “Memory cells” maintain
the capacity to generate their specialized responses, so that a later infection by the same
pathogen can be countered quickly.
Organisms without an adaptive immune system lack such immunological memory,
whereby a pathogen can be “remembered” by its signature antigens.
H. Security failures
The immune system, like other systems, has modes of failure that demonstrate how its
processes work and fail to work in addressing key challenges.
The first type of failure is when an invading organism cannot be overcome by the immune
system. Bacteria are significant challenges to the immune system, and before antibiotics
were available many people died due to failure of the immune system to respond sufficiently
effectively to bacterial diseases. Such failures reflect the tight competitive balance between
bacterial attackers and immune system response. When the immune system is weakened
due to lack of nutrition, compound diseases or particularly effective pathogenic attackers
the immune system response may not be sufficient to prevent growth and replication of the
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bacteria.
The second type of failure is auto-immune disease. This is a failure to distinguish self
from non-self which causes the immune system to attack self cells. This is most common
for the case of some special types of cells, such as insulin-producing cells. It is believed that
the small number of such cells leads to their vulnerability as the immune system may not
sufficiently be exposed to these cells and therefore is more likely to identify them as “other”
and attack them, thereby giving rise to some types of diabetes.[54]
The significance of both of these failure modes for other forms of security is that even
with the best system possible, success is not guaranteed.
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